A stronger Australia can be a more useful US ally

My forecast for 2018 is that except for the very short term, strategic predictions are going to be as hard to make as ever. If we try to be specific we are likely to get them as wrong as we normally do.

Managing strategic uncertainty is not an impossible task as long as you are prepared to acknowledge the risk that defence outcomes involve, decide how much risk you are prepared to accept, the period over which you are prepared to accept that risk, then resource up to that level.

Australia’s national power is potentially enormous but needs focus and balance in diplomatic, economic, cyberspace, intelligence and military spheres.

I consider the 2016 defence white paper to be the best that we have had since 1976, not necessarily in respect of the words in the document but because of the impact on industry, technology, the structure of the Australian Defence Force and financial commitment. It is a credit to the Abbott and Turnbull governments and stands in contrast to the poor legacy of the Rudd-Gillard years.

The ADF, in its ability to offer world-class options to government in today’s strategic environment, is the best I have seen since the end of the Vietnam war. But a defence policy or force has real meaning only in relation to its potential enemies and allies.

For decades the US has described its potential rivals as four nations and an ideology. The four nations are Russia, Iran, China and North Korea, and the ideology is Islamic extremism. The recent US national security strategy confirmed this framework but replaced techniques of “strategic patience” and “leading from behind” with deterrence through effective balance of power, and with the US acting in its own interests.

Until I deployed to Iraq with the US military in 2004-05, I made the common mistake of assuming US power was infinite. The US was indeed powerful after 1945 and even more powerful after winning the Cold War. But the US Army had only 10 full-time combat divisions and, with 3½ of them in Iraq at any one time, it was furiously trying to increase its strength. On the scale of what could happen today, Iraq was a small war. But today, of the 50 brigades that make up the combat elements of the 10 US divisions, only three are said to be combat ready.

The US Navy had 594 ships in 1987; today it has 278. Technology means that it probably does not need 600 ships any more, but it admits to needing 355. The US probably will not be able to build its way out of its deficiency until 2040 or, more likely, 2050.

It is in the air that allies should be most concerned. The US Air Force is said to need 1200 fighters but has just 923; it is also short of 1000 pilots and 3000 maintenance workers. Pilot experience is said to be at historic lows. One overall assessment of the US fighter force is “marginal, trending towards weak”; the consequence is that the USAF could deal with one major regional war but would be “ill equipped” to handle two.US Army aviation and marine aviation are assessed overall as “weak” and US naval aviation as “marginal”. Officials have admitted in public comments that half the F/A-18 Hornet fleet is not ready for combat. The long-term plan is to replace the marines’ fleet of tactical aircraft with the new F-35 fighters, but by 2032.

The US defence budget at $US540bn ($691bn) is comparatively enormous, but so are US responsibilities and the expectations of allies. The inadequacy is admitted by everyone from Donald Trump down, but a deeply indebted US government, which recently has reduced its ability to spend by $US1.5 trillion across the next 10 years through tax cuts, is unlikely to increase defence spending dramatically.